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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 20, 2008, in Courtroom 15 of the
above-entitled court, located at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California
90012, before the Honorable Percy Anderson, defendant Roommate.com, LLC will,
and hereby does, move the Court for summary judgment on plaintiffs' first claim for
relief, for violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, and for dismissal of plaintiffs'
second, third, fourth and fifth claims for relief, for violation of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Business and Professions
Code § 17200, and for negligence, which are grounded entirely in state law.
This Motion is made on the ground that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, for the following
reasons:
1.
	
To the extent that plaintiffs' claims for relief are based on statements
made by third parties in the "Additional Comments" section of their
profiles, or on any use of the roommates.com website other than for its
intended purpose of finding a roommate for shared living, defendant is
immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
47 U.S.C. § 230 ("CDA").
2.
	
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the formatted questions and answers
under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 ("FHA"), because they
have not established the proof of actual injury or diversion of resources
necessary to afford them standing at the summary judgment stage.
3.
	
The FHA does not apply to postings seeking roommates for shared
living, and plaintiffs' claims under the FHA therefore fail as a matter of
law. Further, any interpretation of the FHA to prohibit advertising for
shared living based on sex, sexual orientation, or the presence of
children would violate fundamental constitutional protections of speech
and intimate association. Statutes should be construed to avoid such
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questions where, as here, an alternative interpretation is not only
available, but better reflects the intent of Congress and the interpretation
of the agency charged with enforcing the law.
4.
	
If plaintiffs' claim under federal law is dismissed, as it should be, there
is no reason for the Court to revisit its earlier decision declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' remaining claims
arising purely under state law.
This Motion is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and is based on this
Notice, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently filed
Declarations of Bryan Peters and Timothy L. Alger and their exhibits, the
concurrently filed Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, those
matters of which the Court takes judicial notice, the Court's file in this matter, and
any other evidence and argument as may be presented at the hearing on the Motion.
This Motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local
Rule 7-3, which took place on June 13, 2008.
DATED: September 15, 2008 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER &
HEDGES, LLP
By
T thy L. Alger
Attorneys for Defendant
Roommate.com, LLC
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MEMORANDUMOFPOINTSANDAUTHORITIES
1.
INTRODUCTION
The question presented in this motion is a narrow one: l do solicitations for
roommates for shared living which include answers to questions about sex, sexual
orientation, and the presence of children in the household violate the Federal Fair
Housing Act ("FHA")? The FHA's legislative history, case law and administrative
interpretations of the governmental agency implementing the Act clearly confirm that
they do not.
Before analyzing the solicitations at issue, it is important to bear in mind what
is not in dispute. Under the Ninth Circuit's en bans decision, defendant is immune
from liability for any statements made in the "Additional Comments" section of
users' profiles. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs' claims implicate such comments, they
are barred. Further, plaintiffs have produced no evidence that the website is designed
for any purpose other than to provide a convenient means for roommates to find each
other, and federal law immunizes defendant from liability for unintended uses.
The intended use of the website is simply not encompassed within the
prohibitions of the FHA. Congress intended the FHA to apply to commercial rentals
and sales, not to postings for compatible roommates, and no court has ever held
otherwise. Moreover, any eleventh-hour attempt by plaintiffs to characterize the
website as a commercial vehicle for landlords plainly fails. The disputed conduct
clearly involves postings by private individuals for shared living arrangements.
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the FHA is not only inconsistent with legislative intent,
1 This question is only reached, of course, if the Court concludes that the
plaintiffs have met the preliminary requirements for standing, by presenting proof of
actual injury or diversion of resources as a direct result of defendant's conduct. See
Section 111(B), infra.
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prior regulations and precedent, but would violate the constitutional rights of
defendant and its website users. Accordingly, under the fundamental canon of
statutory construction that legislation should be construed to avoid constitutional
questions, defendant's construction of the statute, which avoids such concerns, should
be upheld, and the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
II.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Roommate.com, LLC ("Roommate" or "defendant") owns and
operates roommates.com, a roommate matching service that is accessed through the
Internet at http:/lwww.roommates.com . (Separate Statement ("SS") ¶ 1.) Individuals
who are looking to share a residence may post information about themselves and their
roommate preferences (SS ¶ 2) and users can search the database based on criteria
such as geographic location and roommate characteristics, including gender, sexual
orientation, and family status, as well as any other criteria they choose. (SS ¶ 3.)
Roommates.com receives over 40,000 visits and 700,000 page views per day. (SS ¶
4.) In any given year, approximately 1 million new postings for roommates are
created by users. (SS ¶ 4.) Among its 140,000 active listings, roughly one-third are
posted by individuals who have a place available to share, and roughly two-thirds by
those who are looking for a place to share. (SS ¶ 5.)
Basic membership, which is free of charge, allows a user to create a personal
profile, conduct searches of the database, and send "roommail" (a form of e-mail
within the website) to other users. (SS ¶ 6.) Users may upgrade their memberships
by paying a fee, which then allows them to read prof le "comments" and receive
"roommail." (SS ¶ 6.) To create a personal profile, a user responds to a series of
questions, including questions as to his or her own gender, sexual orientation, and
whether children will be living with them (SS ¶ 7), and their preferences (if any) with
respect to the gender and sexual orientation of a potential roommate, and whether
they are willing to live with children. (SS ¶ 8.) These roommate preferences are
-2_	 Case No. CV03-9386 PA (RZx)
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optional; the default settings as to each question reflect no preference, and the user
must alter these settings to indicate any preference. (SS ¶ 9.) Users may also include
additional information about themselves, and the residence they are offering to share
or would like to find to share, as "Additional Comments." (SS ¶ 10.)
On September 30, 2004, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant on the ground that plaintiffs' claim under the FHA was barred by the
immunity provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c) ("CDA"). The Court dismissed the federal claim without considering
whether Roommate's actions actually violated the FHA and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
The Ninth Circuit, en banc, affrmed in part and reversed in part. Fair Housing
Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The
Court concluded that while immunity would attach to the statements made by
subscribers in the "Additional Comments" sections of their profiles, and to any
generic searches conducted by users, regardless of the basis for those searches, it
should not attach to the formatted questions and answers about sex, sexual
orientation, and children in the household, and preferences as to those criteria. Id. at
1166. As to the statutory and constitutional questions, the court concluded that "[w]e
need not decide whether any of Roommate's questions actually violate the Fair
Housing Act or California law, or whether they are protected by the First Amendment
or other constitutional guarantees." Id. at 1164. The court expressly left for this
Court the determination whether the FHA applies to postings for roommates, and
whether such a construction of the Act would pass constitutional muster.
W3_
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III.
ARGUMENT
A. The CDA Immunizes Defendant from Liability for "Additional Comments,"
Unprompted Searches, and Unauthorized Uses.
The vast bulk of plaintiffs' amended complaint is a collection of unprompted
statements made by users of Roommate's services in the "Additional Comments"
section of their profiles. 2 These are precisely the comments that the Ninth Circuit
held were within the grant of immunity provided by the CDA, as are any unprompted
searches conducted by users, whatever the terms used. See id. at 1175. To the extent
that plaintiffs' complaint is based on such comments, the claims are barred.
Plaintiffs also cannot salvage their case by redefining defendant's business as a
clearinghouse for commercial rentals. Plaintiffs allege that the defendant each month
"enters into contracts with hundreds of thousands of landlords and sub-leasers to post
rental advertisements." First Amended Complaint ("FAC") at ¶ 10. This is untrue.
The questions that gather information for user profiles and preferences make crystal
clear that the site matches "potential roommates." No options, and no evidence
offered by plaintiffs, suggest that the site offers vacant houses or apartments for sale
or rental. (SS ¶ 12.) The website's name, banner ("The Web's Most Popular
Roommate Matching Service"), and self-description on its home page inform users
that the website does one thing and one thing only: "Roommates.com is a roommate
finder and roommate search service." (SS ¶ 13.) The website's terms of use, which
must be agreed to by all users, specifically state that defendant's services are devoted
to locating individual shared housing, by "provid[ing] users with roommate
resources." (SS ¶ 14.)
2 Indeed, every single statement included in para. 15-32 of the FAC is drawn
from the "Additional Comments." (SS ¶¶ 11.)
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
04 1 7 7126 330 7 7.4
Case 2:03-cv-09386-PA-RZ   Document 122   Filed 09/15/08   Page 11 of 32   Page ID #:816
Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that roommates.com is a commercial
rental service for landlords. Any such evidence would be irrelevant in any event.
Defendant cannot be held liable for the misuse of its site for unlawful purposes, any
more than the dating site in Carafano v. Metrosplash.cam, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
2003), was liable for the defamatory comments made by the "anonymous dastard"
whose use of the site was "contrary to the website's express policies."
Roommates. corn, 521 F.3d at 1171. And, any statement in a profile suggesting that
the person posting an available residence is a landlord, or that the residence is a
vacant house or apartment (and not a roommate situation) would necessarily appear
in the "Additional Comments" section, and is unprompted -- indeed, such a statement
conflicts with the site's formatted questions. (SS ¶ 17.) No liability can be based on
such unprompted statements. Roommates. corn, 521 F.3d at 1166.
The issue here is not whether an Internet service that require commercial
landlords to advertise for tenants according to gender or family status might be
subject to liability under the FHA; plainly it would be, given that only discriminatory
animus would explain such a practice. Rather, the issue presented is whether the
FHA governs a site that operates solely for "provid[ing] users with roommate
resources" for shared living accommodations. Before that question can even be
reached, however, plaintiffs must first establish that they have standing to raise it, a
burden they have failed to meet.
B.
	
Plaintiffs Lack Standing Under the Fair Housing Act
In Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Supreme Court
extended standing under the FHA beyond individuals to organizations fighting actual
discrimination in housing. Organizations have standing if the owner's steering
practices "perceptively impaired the organization's ability to provide housing
counseling and referral services" and drained its resources. Id. at 379. The Supreme
Court strongly cautioned, however, that an organization must show "concrete and
_5_
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demonstrable injury to [its] activities," not "simply a setback to the organization's
abstract social interests," to establish standing. Id.
Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit in Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir. 1990), and the Third Circuit in Fair Housing Council v. Montgomery
Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71 (3rd Cir. 1998), extended standing to organizations
challenging advertisers if the organizations could meet the same test applicable to
individuals. "[T]he organization must show actual or threatened injury in fact that is
fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable
court decision." Spann, 899 F.2d at 27.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that the postings on roommates.com caused
them to devote "significant efforts, expenses, and resources in responding to
defendant's discriminatory statements and investigating the discriminatory practices
alleged herein." (FAC ¶ 49.) Although such allegations may well be enough to
afford plaintiffs standing at the motion to dismiss stage, they are insufficient at the
summary judgment stage. In order to "defeat the summary judgment motion based
on the issue of standing, the [organization] was required to submit `affidavits or other
evidence showing through specific facts ... that ... it [was] `directly' affected [by
the alleged discrimination]."' Montgomery, 141 F.3d at 76 (citations omitted). While
the court recognized that the plaintiffs allegations "were sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss," the court held that "something more than these naked allegations
was required at the summary judgment stage," and noted that "each element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive
stages of the litigation." Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. They have not submitted one piece
of concrete evidence to show how any of their resources have been diverted because
of Roommate's formatted questions about gender, sexual orientation, or presence of
children in the household. In Montgomery, the plaintiff-organization claimed that it
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had standing because it was forced to divert resources to "(1) an educational
campaign designed to counteract the discriminatory effect of the advertisements; (2)
an investigation designed to determine the existence and extent of on-going
discrimination in advertising; and (3) litigation." Id. The court rejected the first
argument because "the only evidence relating to implementation of an educational
effort was the organization's allegation that, at some future time, it would be required
to spend almost $100,000 in newspaper advertising and over $300,000 in seminars
and mailings to reach consumers to counter the advertisements' discriminatory
message," which it found to be insufficient. Id at 77; see also Louisiana ACORN
Fair Housing v. Leblanc, 211 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no organizational
standing because plaintiff failed to show how defendant's conduct caused "a specific
drain on its resources"); Arkansas ACORN Fair Housing, Inc. v. Greystone
Development, Ltd. Co., 160 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 1988) (same).
The Montgomery court rejected the second argument because the investigation
at issue consisted of no more than "having its staff members review classified
advertisements placed in Montgomery and other suburban Philadelphia newspapers
on an ongoing basis for evidence of discrimination," which was in fact part of the
"normal day-to-day operations" of the organization, and not caused by the defendant's
conduct. 141 F.3d at 78. Finally, as to litigation costs, the-Montgomery court held
that litigation costs alone do not confer standing on an organization: "Were the rule
otherwise, any litigant could create injury in fact by bringing a case, and Article III
would present no real limitation." Spann, 899 F.2d at 219. The Ninth Circuit
adopted the same rule in Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs in this case have produced even less evidence than in Montgomery.
They have offered no evidence of diversion of resources to education targeted at the
wrongdoing alleged against defendant -- asking formatted questions about gender,
sexual orientation, and the presence of children. Rather, they seek damages for the
standard efforts at community outreach and professional conferences that they have
-7-	 Case No. CV03-9386 PA (RZx)
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hosted or attended for years prior to the creation of roommates.com. When they have
discussed this dispute or the roommates.com Site, it has been either in a very general
context, such as "advertising" or "Internet advertising" for housing, or simply a
sharing of information with other housing advocates about this litigation. No effort
was made to address or "mitigate" alleged harm from roommate advertising or the
roommates.com site. (SS ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs seek damages for their "normal day-to-day
operations," and that does not confer standing.
Further, plaintiffs have provided no evidence that any particular individual or
group of individuals was denied access to housing or wrongly discriminated against
due to defendant's questions. (SS ¶ 20.) This is a case without any cognizable
injury; it arises solely from plaintiffs' distaste for defendant's website. As in
Montgomery, plaintiffs simply do not have standing to pursue this litigation.
C. The FHA Does Not Apply to Postings for Roommates
The words and history of the FHA, the regulations and memoranda issued by
HUD, the exemptions specifically provided in other federal acts to allow same sex-
roommates, and the opinions of every single court and agency to address the question
clearly establish that the FHA applies to commercial sales and rentals of property as
well as advertisements for such property -- not to roommate situations 3 , or to postings
3 Although courts have applied the FHA to commercial and charitable
organizations operating group homes, such holdings have been limited to situations
where an array of residents are housed in a group situation. See, e.g., Turning Point
v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1996) (homeless shelter liable for FHA
violation for failing to make reasonable accommodations); United States v.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220 (D. Puerto Rico 1974) (injunction
appropriate to see if local ordinance requiring permit for a nursing home violated the
FHA); United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 548 (D. Va. 1975)
(FHA applies to children's home as a whole). None of these cases involved the
assignment of individuals to share a room. The individual selection of roommates
typically involves highly personal choices because of the intimate nature of the
contact, including sharing bathrooms, kitchens, and sometimes bedrooms.
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by individuals aimed at finding suitable roommates. The FHA "stops at the front
door," Senior Civil Liberties Ass 'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir.
1992). It does not dictate that men must share apartments with women, or that single
people must live with those who have children, or that gays and straights cannot
prefer those with similar orientations as roommates.
1.
	
The Legislative History Establishes that the FHA was Aimed at
Commercial Sales and Rentals.
The FHA prohibits any "statement ... with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates ... an intention to make [a] preference, limitation, or
discrimination" on the basis of a protected category, including race, religion, or sex.4
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The prohibition on discriminatory advertising effectuates the
prohibition on actual discrimination in the Act. 5 Nothing could be clearer than that
Congress, in enacting the FHA, aimed to prohibit discrimination in the commercial
sale and rental of houses and apartments by brokers, landlords, and owners -- not to
tell individuals with whom they must share their homes. Its goal was to expand the
ability of African Americans to buy and rent homes, not to control roommate choices.
4 There is no allegation in this case, and certainly no evidence, that either the
questions or the preference prompts which the Ninth Circuit held to be outside the
immunity of the CDA include any reference to race or religion.
5 The only difference between the substantive prohibitions of the Act and the
advertising provisions relates to the "Mrs. Murphy" exception, discussed infra, which
exempts landlords in owner-occupied buildings containing four or fewer units from
the substantive -- but not the advertising -- prohibitions of the Act. There is no basis,
in the language of the Act, the legislative history, or any judicial opinion or
administrative regulation, for any argument that, except with respect to the Mrs.
Murphy situation, Congress intended the advertising prohibitions to be broader than
the actual discrimination provisions; any such interpretation would, by definition,
involve suppression of speech as to lawful activity, in violation of the First
Amendment.
28
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"It is undeniable that the fair housing provisions were aimed toward actual
sales and rentals of real estate." Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (en banc) (emphasis added). As Senator Walter F. Mondale, the prime sponsor
of the Act explained, "The bill permits an owner to do everything that he could do
anyhow with his property -- insist upon the highest price, give it to his brother or to
his wife, sell it to his best friend, do everything he could every do with property,
except refuse to sell it to a person based solely on the basis of color or religion." 2
Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970), at
1751 ("Schwartz") (emphasis added). The explanatory memorandum from the
Department of Justice was to the same effect: "What is prohibited is the use of sales
and rental services and facilities, i.e., the use of a professional real estate dealer or
other person in the business of selling or renting dwellings to help in accomplishing
the individual's discriminatory purpose." Id. at 1692 (original emphasis). So was the
statement by co-sponsor Emanuel Cellars in the House of Representatives: "What is
needed to end housing discrimination is a universal Federal law with uniform
coverage so there will be a single set of rules everywhere for everyone -- buyers,
sellers, and real estate brokers." Id. at 1778 (emphasis added).
Indeed, Congress excluded from the Act's prohibitions the sale or rental of
owner-occupied dwellings of less than four units, the so-called "Mrs. Murphy"
exception which, while not applicable to advertising, clearly evinced Congress' intent
not to regulate even commercial relationships involving separate dwellings where
doing so might infringe on privacy interests. As Senator Hubert Humphrey
explained, the Mrs. Murphy exemption from the FHA was based on a similar
exemption from Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
discrimination in public accommodations. Senator Humphrey described Title II as
"carefully drafted and moderate in nature. There is no desire to regulate truly personal
or private relationships." Schwartz, supra at 1194. Nowhere in the Congressional
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debate is there so much as a suggestion that either the prohibitions of the FHA or its
advertising limitations were intended to apply to roommate selection.
Moreover, four years later, when Congress passed Title IX of the Education
Act prohibiting sex discrimination by any educational institution that receives federal
funds, it explicitly exempted from the discrimination prohibited by that Act separate
housing on the basis of sex. See 20 U.S.C. § 1686 ("[N]othing contained herein shall
be construed to prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this Act .. .
from maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes."); 45 C.F.R. §
86.32 (educational institutions "may provide separate housing on the basis of sex").
But there is no mention in Title IX of an exemption from the FHA, and no suggestion
in the legislative history that such an exemption was necessary for single-sex dorms
or sex-based roommate assignments.
Indeed, HUD itself, in the regulations it published applying the FHA, made
clear that not only were universities entitled to assign roommates by sex; they were
also entitled to maintain entire dormitories limited to one sex, and to advertise for
them. See Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, 876 F. Supp. 1231, 1243
(D. Utah 1995) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 86.32(c)(2)), vacated on other grounds, 98 F.3d
590 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that advertisements for single-sex on-campus and off-
campus housing for students did not violate the FHA). Under plaintiffs' theory, such
an interpretation would be beyond the authority of HUD, for it would amount to
selectively rewriting the Act. See Wilcox v. Ives, 676 F. Supp. 355, 357 (D. Maine
1987) (rejecting agency regulation that is inconsistent with statute). In fact, it is the
common practice of colleges and universities to solicit information and assign
roommates based on information about gender and children, and in some cases,
sexual identification as well. Had Congress even thought that the FHA applied to
shared living situations, it would have mentioned it specifically in the exemption it
granted for single-sex dorms and dorm rooms under Title IX. It did not, for the very
simple reason that the FHA was inapplicable to such situations.
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2.
	
HUD Has Construed the FHA as Not Reaching Shared Living
Arrangements.
After the passage of the FHA, HUD issued regulations aimed, among other
things, at clarifying the kinds of advertising the Act prohibited and the type of
complaints HUD would pursue. The applicable regulation, 24 C.F.R. 109.20,
specifically stated that sex-based advertisements for shared living quarters were not
prohibited by the Act:
The following words, phrases, symbols, and forms typify those most
often used in residential real estate advertising to convey either overt or
tacit discriminatory preferences or limitations. In considering a
complaint under the Fair Housing Act, the Department will normally
consider the use of these and comparable words, phrases, symbols, and
forms to indicate a possible violation of the act and to establish a need
for further proceedings on the complaint, if it is apparent from the
context of the usage that discrimination within the meaning of the act is
likely to result.
(a) Words descriptive of dwelling, landlord, and tenants. White private
home, Colored home, Jewish home, Hispanic residence, adult building.
(b) Words indicative of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin .. .
5) Sex -- the exclusive use of words in advertisements, including
those involving the rental of separate units in a single or multi-
family dwelling, stating or tending to imply that the housing being
advertised is available to persons of only one sex and not the
other, except where the sharing of living areas is involved.
Nothing in this part restricts advertisements of dwellings used
exclusively for dormitory facilities by educational institutions.
24 C.F.R. 109.20 (emphasis added). 6
6 While part 109 was officially withdrawn from the Code of Federal Regulations
by directive no. FR-4029-F-01, effective May 1, 1996, it continues to represent the
positions of HUD on advertising issues, except as they were superseded by Roberta
(footnote continued)
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On January 9, 1995, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity Roberta Achtenberg issued a Memorandum intended to clarify the HUD
regulation quoted above. In particular, she addressed the issue of whose
responsibility it was -- the person placing the ad or the publisher of it -.. to ensure that
sex-specific advertisements for roommates were in fact seeking individuals for shared
living. Achtenberg instructed HUD officials not to accept complaints against
newspapers for ads seeking "female roommates;" she advised that the person placing
the ad, not the newspaper that publishes it, is responsible for assuring that the
advertisement was for shared living:
For example, Intake staff should not accept a complaint against a
newspaper for running an advertisement which includes the phrase
female roommate wanted because the advertisement does not indicate.
whether the requirements for the shared living exception have been met.
Publishers can rely on the representations of the individual placing the
ad that shared living arrangements apply to the property in question.
HUD's recognition that the prohibitions of the FHA do not apply to shared
living, not to mention its directive that the individual placing the ad -- not the
publisher of it -- is responsible for ensuring that it is for shared living, should be
controlling here. No amendments by Congress or new regulations by HUD have
been enacted since 1995 that alter that understanding. 8 The fact that the Achtenberg
Memorandum is specifically addressed to sex-based roommate ads, rather than to all
Achtenberg's memo, discussed infra. See United States v. Old Kent Financial Corp.,
2004 WL 115779 at * 1 (ED. Mich. May 19, 2004).
7 Declaration of Timothy L. Alger, ¶ 10, Ex. H (Memorandum by Roberta
Achtenberg, dated January 9, 1995, available at:
www.hud.govlofficeslfheo/disabilitieslsect804achtenberg.pdf). Defendant requests
that the Court, if appropriate, take judicial notice of the Memorandum. Fed. R. Evid.
201
8 Plaintiffs acknowledge that gender-based roommate selection and advertising
are not unlawful.
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of the criteria addressed by the Act, in no way undercuts its force. The three
questions and search prompts at issue in this case are gender, sexual orientation, and
the presence of children. Sex is addressed specifically by the Achtenberg
Memorandum; sexual orientation is not addressed at all by the FHA; and the FHA's
provisions against discrimination against individuals with children, as the Eleventh
Circuit has held, "stop at the front door." See Senior Civil Liberties Ass 'n v. Kemp,
965 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1992), discussed infra.
3.
	
No Court or Agency that Has Considered the Question Has Applied the
FHA to Shared Living Arrangements or Postings for Such
Arrangements.
The position taken by HUD is precisely the same as the position taken by every
court to consider the application of the FHA to roommate assignment or shared-living
situations. In Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, supra, the court faced
the questions whether Brigham Young University violated the FHA when it
segregated students by sex in both on- and off-campus housing, and whether
landlords providing this off-campus housing violated the Act by advertising this
housing as male or female only. The court recognized that Title IX expressly allows
a university to segregate students by gender in housing and advertise such
segregation. 876 F. Supp. at 1243 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 86.32(a)-(b) (1993)
(educational institutions `may provide separate housing on the basis of sex' provided
that they do not apply `different rules or regulations' related to that housing);
§ 86.32(c)(2) ("sex-segregated housing may be provided `through solicitation, listing,
approval of housing, or otherwise' ")). For a court to apply the FHA to universities in
this context, it "would be forced to disagree with the interpretation given to both the
Fair Housing Act and Title IX by the very same federal agencies who are charged
with enforcing those statutes" -- interpretations that the court held were entitled to
"substantial deference." Id. at 1244-45 (noting that both U.S. Department of Justice
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and U.S. Department of Education expressly sanctioned segregation of college
students by gender).
The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion as to the reach of the FHA in
protecting families with children against discrimination. In Senior Civil Liberties
Ass 'n, supra, persons living in a condominium complex that forbade children under a
certain age challenged the application of the FHA to their complex, on the ground
that the FHA violated their First Amendment right of intimate association. The court
rejected their challenge precisely because it concluded that the Act did not control
who lived within particular units, but only whether individuals with children could be
excluded from purchasing their own units. "If the Act were trying to force plaintiffs
to take children into their home, this argument might have some merit. But the Act
violates no privacy rights because it stops at the [plaintiffs ] front door. " 965 F.2d at
1036 (emphasis added). 9
The Washington State Attorney General, faced with questions as to the scope
of a state law version of the FHA, reached the same conclusion. The Attorney
General concluded that it is lawful for "a person to discriminate on the basis of sex,
age or religion in selecting a roommate with whom to share living quarters, or for a
person to specify in an advertisement for a roommate that the roommate must be of a
particular sex, age or religion, or for a newspaper to publish an advertisement for a
roommate when the advertisement contains such a specification." 1976 Op. Wash.
A.G. 17, at 1, 1976 WL 168501. The Opinion found that "one of the societal values
which is deserving of recognition , in our view, is the basic freedom to control one's
life by choosing the sex of person with whom one lives." Id. at 4-5. Notably, there is
nothing in the Opinion suggesting that, without regard to the possible interpretation
9 See also Texas v. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("Liberty protects the
person from unwarranted government intrusion into a dwelling or other private
places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.").
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of state law, such postings could violate federal law. Indeed, counsel for Roommate
has been unable to find a single published case in which any court, state or federal,
has concluded that postings for shared living violate the FHA., or the many state
equivalents.
D.
	
Plaintiffs' Interpretation of the FHA Would Raise Serious Constitutional
Questions and Violate Fundamental Constitutional Rights
The "canon of constitutional avoidance ... requires a statute to be construed so
as to avoid serious doubts as to the constitutionality of an alternate construction."
Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S.
289, 299-300 (2001)) ("[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the
statute is `fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such
problems."'); US. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 286 (2005) (same). This principle of
constitutional avoidance, "which `has for so long been applied by this Court that it is
beyond debate,' ... is intended to show respect for Congress by presuming it
`legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.'" Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, as defendant has demonstrated, the FHA clearly does not apply to
postings for roommates. However, even assuming arguendo that a contrary
interpretation is possible, it is at least equally plausible that the FHA is inapplicable.
And since barring private individuals from obtaining information necessary to guide
their choice of roommates raises serious constitutional concerns, this Court should,
under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, adopt the construction set forth by
defendant that does not raise such questions. Plaintiffs' construction of the statute
would prevent defendant and its subscribers from identifying roommates based on
certain natural preferences (e.g., same gender, sexual orientation, or presence of
children), thereby infringing the rights to intimate association and privacy, as well as
freedom of expression of defendant's members. This breach of fundamental rights is
unwarranted and should be avoided.
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1.
	
The Associational Rights At Stake Warrant Heightened Protection.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right of "intimate association" as a
protected liberty interest under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See
NA.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 844, 852053 (1978); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). As the
Supreme Court recognized in Roberts, "[t]he right of private association protects the
choice of individuals and organizations `to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships ... against undue intrusion by the State," and "reflects the
realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties
with others." Id. at 617-19. "Protecting these relationships form unwarranted state
interference ... safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is
central to any concept of liberty." Id. As a corollary, the right of association "plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (citation omitted;
emphasis added).
While the Supreme Court and lower courts have recognized that relationships
deserving the highest level of constitutional protection relate to the "creation and
sustenance of family," including marriage, the begetting, raising and educating of
children, and cohabitation with relatives, see id., the right to intimate association has
not been restricted to the family context. See Board of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) ("We have not held that constitutional
protection is restricted to relationships among family members."). Instead of
adopting a categorical approach, the Supreme Court conducts a "careful assessment
of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the
most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments." Roberts, 468 U.S. at
620; see also Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass 'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d
1483 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546).
As part of that inquiry, courts have examined whether the relationship at issue
involves "deep attachments and commitments to necessarily few other individuals
-17_	 Case No. CV03-9386 FA (RZx)
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
04177/2633077.4
Case 2:03-cv-09386-PA-RZ   Document 122   Filed 09/15/08   Page 24 of 32   Page ID #:829
45
with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
Courts have considered "such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship." Id. In contrast, relationships which lack
such attributes, "such as those found in the impersonal hierarchy of a large
corporation or other business organization" are "`remote' from the privacy concerns
giving rise to constitutional protection...." Pacfc-Union Club v. Superior Court,
232 Cal. App. 3 d 60, 72 (1991).
Between these two poles "lies a broad range of human relationships that may
make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection from particular incursions
by the State." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. In Roberts 10 and Rotary Club " , the Supreme
Court denied associational protection to groups that lacked the requisite smallness,
selectivity, focus and exclusion to warrant constitutional protection. In contrast,
denial of membership access, even on discriminatory grounds, has been upheld in
' ° With respect to the Jaycees in Roberts, the local chapters were large (400
members) and unselective since "new members [were] routinely recruited and
admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds." Roberts, 486 U.S. at 621.
Accordingly, since "much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of
the association involves the participation of strangers to that relationship," id., "the
Jaycees chapters lack[ed] the distinctive characteristics that might afford
constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." Id.
" The Rotary clubs were deemed not to be intimate associations because the
sizes varied from 20 to over 900, with no upper limit on membership, the clubs had
"inclusive, not exclusive" membership policies, and clubs were instructed to "keep a
flow of [membership] prospects coming" to achieve "a true cross section of the
business and professional life of the community." Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546. In
addition, many of the clubs' "central activities [were] carried on in the presence of
strangers ...." Id. at 546-547. In short, the Court found that "Rotary Clubs, rather
than carrying on their activities in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their
`windows and doors open to the whole world. "' Id. at 547.
28
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cases where organizations are tight-knit, selective, exclusionary and focused on a
particular social purpose. For instance, in, Louisiana Debating, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the application of a New Orleans ordinance, which prohibited discrimination
in places of public accommodation, to four social clubs in New Orleans because the
clubs had a "purely social purpose" and selected members based on "character,
relationships and acquaintances, congeniality and compatibility." 42 F.3d at 1496.
The court noted that the clubs' admission policies were highly restrictive, non-
members were excluded from the clubs' facilities, and each club had upper limits on
membership. See id. Accordingly, the court found that the clubs were entitled to the
highest level of constitutional protection. 12 Likewise, in Pacific-Union Club, the
court upheld the associational rights of a private club in rejecting the Franchise Tax
Board's efforts to obtain its membership lists in order to regulate compliance with a
ban on tax deductions for business expenses at clubs that engage in discriminatory
membership practices. 232 Cal. App. 3d at 72. In upholding the club's liberty
interest, the court noted that in contrast to Roberts and Rotary Club, the club was
"much farther toward the intimate pole of the associational spectrum," due to its
smaller membership, organizational structure, geographic focus, highly restrictive
membership practices and focus on congeniality. Id. at 73. Similarly, in Hart v. Cult
Awareness Network, 13 Cal. App. 4th 777 (1993), the court upheld the right of
intimate association of a "`well-defined subgroup ... whose membership is highly
restricted and selective, based on shared opinions, thoughts and concerns with respect
to `destructive cults. "' Id. at 788-89 (citations omitted).
While plaintiffs might attempt to focus the Court on roommate.com's traffic or
number of active listings to place defendant within the Roberts/Rotary Club line of
25
26
27
I2 Cf. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that applying
New Jersey's public accommodations law to require Boy Scouts to admit homosexual
plaintiff violated Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association).
28
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cases, the relevant association is not the number of visiting eyeballs or website
postings, but the nature of the association involved in the challenged practice. Here,
the relevant "association" is between potential roommates posting and viewing such
notices. Defendant is entitled to assert this third-party interest on behalf of its users.
See US v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008)
(where First Amendment privacy interests were at stake, "[a]n association has
standing to sue on behalf of its members when they would otherwise have
independent standing to sue, the interests sought to be protected are germane to the
organization's purpose, and the claim asserted does not require the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit"); see also Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, 271 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2001). Since interpreting the FHA
to preclude roommates.com from requiring or transmitting such information would
directly burden those seeking safe and compatible shared living arrangements, these
associational interests are entitled to heightened scrutiny.
Indeed, the associational interests at stake here have many of the attributes of a
familial relationship. Individuals who obtain roommates through the service will
share kitchen and living spaces, and, in some circumstances, bathrooms or bedrooms.
Much like families, their lives will become closely intertwined, as they share meals
and expenses, work out compromises and resolve interpersonal conflicts, entertain
guests, overhear conversations, and see each other at their best and worst. In short,
these quasi-familial relationships have the requisite selectivity, smallness and
seclusion from others to fall within the heightened zone of constitutional protection.
As part of their search process, individuals seeking shared living arrangements
are understandably concerned about both compatibility and personal security; it is not
unreasonable, for instance, for women to want to room with other women out of
concern for their physical safety, to reduce the likelihood of unwanted sexual
advances, to enhance their ability to move freely -- clad or unclad -- throughout their
living space, and to form bonds enhanced by common interests and shared attributes.
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Likewise, singles who are not accustomed to the demands of children may reasonably
wish to live with other singles or select certain age categories of children to
accommodate their lifestyles. And single mothers or fathers may wish to obtain the
support systems associated with rooming with other single parents. Defendant, in
making information about such personal characteristics available to its users,
facilitates associational ties that involve "`distinctively personal aspect of one's life."'
Hart, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 788 (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545). Plaintiffs'
assumption that the communication of such information necessarily reveals an intent
to "discriminate" misapprehends the lawful and practical reasons, entirely unrelated
to any prohibited bias or animus, that individuals seeking shared living arrangements
may have in knowing the characteristics of potential roommates. 13 In short, on the
"broad range of human relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to
constitutional protection from particular incursions by the State ...,' the relationship .
.., objectively assessed, primarily involves the intimate personal concerns and
activities deserving of a high level of constitutional protection." Hart, 13 Cal. App.
4th at 789.
2.
	
Plaintiffs' Proposed Interpretation Cannot Satisfy Strict Scrutiny.
Because defendant and its members have associational rights protected by the
highest level of constitutional scrutiny, plaintiff must demonstrate that its attempted
regulation of postings for shared living arrangements satisfies strict scrutiny.
Accordingly, plaintiff must show that preventing roommates.com or its users from
posting or reviewing roommate solicitations identified according to gender, sexual
orientation and the presence of children is justified by a compelling state interest and
I3 Indeed, defendant's members often undergo a rigorous process before entering
into a shared living arrangement, including e-mail communications, phone
conversation, and inspection of the residence. (SS ¶ 18.) Only when both parties are
satisfied that the rooming relationship is viable does the shared arrangement occur.
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is the least intrusive method to satisfy that interest. See Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1980); N.A.A. C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463; Brock v. Local 375,
Plumbers Intern. Union of America, AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir. 1988). 14
"The state bears a `particularly heavy' burden of establishing a compelling state
interest ... in this highly sensitive constitutional area ..., `[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. "' Pacific-
Union Club, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 78 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963) (citations omitted)). Moreover, "[e]ven if such a compelling interest is
present, it `cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." Id. (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
In this case, there is certainly a compelling interest in preventing discrimination
in the sale and rental of dwellings, and in ensuring that those who have been
traditional targets of discrimination have an opportunity to secure housing. But there
is absolutely no evidence that this interest is being negatively impacted by respecting
individual freedom of association to choose roommates. Plaintiffs' own examples
belie the notion of any systemic preferences for or against any vulnerable group and
demonstrate as many instances of individuals seeking homosexual roommates as
heterosexual ones, and women as men. (FAC ¶¶ 15-32.) In short, this case does not
implicate the civil rights concerns addressed by passage of the FHA.
14 Even under intermediate scrutiny, plaintiffs' action fails because preventing
the elicitation of information necessary to ensure safe and compatible living
arrangements does not serve any substantial governmental interest. See Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). The
only plausible justification -- prevention of discrimination -- is not implicated here
since the preference for individuals with similar characteristics produces no pattern of
exclusion of any protected group. Moreover, plaintiffs' interpretation would clearly
suppress free expression since plaintiff seeks to ban the solicitation and conveyance
of information at the heart of First Amendment expression.
04] 7711633077.4
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The relief sought by plaintiff would require individuals seeking shared living
arrangements either to entirely suppress their desire for roommates with similar
characteristics (and take their chances, for instance, in mixed-gender roommate
situations) or, more likely, to go to lengthy and cumbersome means to ascertain the
characteristics of potential roommates (e.g., through numerous face-to-face
meetings). As the Supreme Court has recognized, "associational rights `are protected
not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more
subtle governmental interference ...."' Lyng v. International Union, etc., 485 U.S.
360, 367 n.5 (1988) (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)).
However laudable plaintiffs' abstract goals, it is simply not government's role to
regulate private rooming choices. See Gouvela v. Sears, 2006 WL 2882826 at *3 (D.
Or. Oct. 6, 2006) ("Whether called a right to intimate association ... or a right to
privacy ... , the point is similar: `choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of
the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to
our constitutional scheme, "') (citations omitted). 15
I5 It follows, of course, that if the underlying activity -- preferring to live with
individuals of a similar sex, sexual orientation, or family composition -- is lawful,
then both the individual subscribers and defendant have a right to advertise such
preferences to effectuate their lawful intent. There is no basis to argue that while
particular preferences in roommate selection are lawful, advertisements designed to
effectuate such preferences are not. See, e.g., Housing Opportunities Made Equal,
Inc. v. Cincinnatti Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 651-53 (6th Cir. 1991). The ban on
sex-specific employment advertising at issue is Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm. on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), turned on the illegality of engaging in
sex discrimination in employment.
0417712633077.4
-23-	 Case No. CV03-9386 PA (RZx)
DEFENDANT`S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
28
Case 2:03-cv-09386-PA-RZ   Document 122   Filed 09/15/08   Page 30 of 32   Page ID #:835
16
7
8
9
10
04177/1633077.4
3.
	
Plaintiffs' Proposed Interpretation Violates the Right to Receive and
Convey Information.
Plaintiffs' construction of the statute also would violate the right to receive and
convey information and solicit responses -- bedrock First Amendment values -- by
precluding individuals from obtaining or sharing information related to central
aspects of their personhood. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943) ("It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas."); see id. at 146-147 ("Freedom to distribute information to
every citizen ... is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting
aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it
must be fully preserved."); Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522
U.S. 359, 386-387 (1998) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Our
decisions have concluded that First Amendment protection extends equally to the
right to receive information ... , and to the right to solicit information or responses.")
(citingEdenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765-766 (1993); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)); Conant v.
Walters, 209 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) ("It is well established that the right to
hear -- the right to receive information -- is no less protected by the First Amendment
than the right to speak ... Indeed, the right to hear and the right to speak are flip sides
of the same coin.").
While these protections apply to purely commercial speech, see Edenfield, 567
U.S. at 766-767, they apply with even greater force to speech that is tied to
fundamental rights of privacy and personhood. Indeed, even information that is
deemed to lack "social worth" is entitled to protection. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (the "right to receive information and ideas regardless of their
social worth, is fundamental to our free society."). Accordingly, no matter how
plaintiffs or the Court view individuals' desires to live with persons with shared
characteristics, and to obtain the information necessary to effectuate such preferences,
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the questions regarding gender, sexual orientation and children, designed to permit
informed decision-making about roommate selection, fall squarely within the First
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, defendant Roommate.com, LLC respectfully requests
that the Court grant summary judgment in its favor on the first claim for relief,
dismiss the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c), and dismiss the action in its entirety.
DATED: September 15, 2008 QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER &
KEDGES, LLP
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